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CAPTIVE OR CRIMINAL?
REAPPRAISING THE LEGAL STATUS OF IRA
PRISONERS AT THE HEIGHT OF THE TROUBLES
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
SAMANTHA ANNE CAESAR*
ABSTRACT
For the citizens of Ireland and Great Britain, the second half of the
twentieth century represents a period of great political struggle. The
historical debate concerns the constitutional status of Northern Ireland; that
is, whether the six northeastern most counties on the emerald isle belong to
Ireland or to the United Kingdom. The late 1960s through the early 1990s is
referred to commonly as “The Troubles,” a time rife with political struggle,
violence, and reactionary laws aimed at restricting civil liberties in the name
of security. One topic of contention during this era relates to the political
status of prisoners convicted of terrorism. These men and women—mostly
suspected members of a nationalist paramilitary, the provisional Irish
Republican Army—claimed a right to special treatment as prisoners of war.
The British rejected the notion that an international war existed in fact, and
insisted on treating the prisoners as ordinary criminals under domestic law.
The conflict in Northern Ireland is too often and too easily dismissed as
a purely internal matter, regarded a domestic civil rights movement.
Consequently, any potential consideration of the conflict as an international
armed conflict has been disregarded. This paper will reexamine the
classification of The Troubles in light of current, applicable international
law to make two determinations: first, to ascertain whether the armed
conflict may be classified as one of an international, rather than a noninternational, character. Based on this classification, this paper will then
discern whether IRA prisoners should have been entitled to prisoner of war
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or some other discrete legal status, separate from that of ordinary criminals.
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INTRODUCTION
The most well-known and most broadly adopted treaties in the
international community revolve around war and peace. At the end of World
War II, nation states across the globe recognized the need for universal rules
limiting and regulating the armed conflict. In the opening lines of the United
Nations Charter, a treaty centered around the maintenance of international
peace and security, all Member States commit themselves to refrain from
using armed force whenever possible.1 At the same time, the international
community has accepted the inevitable reality that states will nevertheless
resort to the use of force for various reasons. Therefore, the majority of

1. U.N. Charter art. 2 ¶ 4. (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force again the territorial integrity or political independence of any sate, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”).
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United Nations Member States have also signed agreements governing the
use of force in armed conflicts. The most prominent of these treaties is the
Geneva Conventions, first signed in 1949.2 The Geneva Conventions and
their Additional Protocols are a series of international agreements governing
the protection and treatment of non-participants in armed conflicts. As
discussed below,3 the Geneva Conventions contemplate two types of armed
conflict: those of an international character and those not of an international
character.4 The line between these two types of armed conflict began to blur
after World War II, and has become increasingly vague due to a proliferation
of activity by non-state actors. Unfortunately, the haziness of the line
between international and non-international armed conflicts comes with
serious legal consequences. One such consequence is illustrated by the
conflict in Northern Ireland.
Much of the literature on the conflict, also known as “The Troubles,”
(particularly regarding the status of potential human rights violations) has
either presupposed that the conflict is a non-international conflict, or too
quickly dismissed the idea that the conflict is indeed an international one.
One particular issue these hasty, preliminary conclusions have affected is the
evaluation of the political status granted by the British government to
arrested and imprisoned members of the Irish Republic Army (“IRA”)
during the late-1970s and early-1980s. During this period, the British
government refused to recognize IRA detainees as prisoners of war
(“POWs”).5 While the British granted IRA prisoners a distinctive political
status (“Special Category Status”) at the outset of The Troubles, this policy
was rescinded by 1975.6
According to the Geneva Conventions, POW status must be conferred
on detained combatants whenever the conflict at issue is of an international
character.7 When a conflict is of a non-international character, however,

2. Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention (II)
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention (III) relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention
(IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter collectively Geneva Conventions].
3. Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 5 ¶ 2, Aug. 12, 1949,
T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; see infra Section II.A.
4. Id.
5. See discussion infra Section I.C.3.
6. See discussion infra Section I.C.3.
7. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 3, art. 4.
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states have no legal obligation to grant captured soldiers POW status.8 In
short, by remaining silent on the issue, other states have implicitly accepted
both the British government’s classification of the conflict as noninternational, as well as its refusal to grant POW status, or any other political
status, to IRA prisoners as lawful under international law.9
This paper takes a different view. A deeper look at international law and
relations between Ireland and the United Kingdom during the late 1970s and
early 1980s reveals that there is a strong case for treating the conflict in
Northern Ireland as an international, rather than a non-international, conflict
under international law. Therefore, whether the denial of POW status to IRA
prisoners during this time was lawful is questionable at best. This paper
argues that, at the very least, the British government should have continued
to grant Special Category Status to IRA prisoners as it had at the outset of
The Troubles. The revocation of Special Category Status was a mistake.
This paper begins with a historical overview of the conflict. By
providing critical context, this section allows the reader to understand the
respective perspectives of the parties involved. This background is especially
helpful to comprehending how the IRA views its own role in the conflict.
The section ends with the introduction and subsequent revocation of “Special
Category Status” conferred upon IRA prisoners, which led to massive
political protests. Next, this paper sets out the laws applicable to noncombatants in both international and non-international armed conflict. For
present purposes, the relevant laws are all found in the Geneva Conventions
and its Additional Protocols. The final section of this paper applies these
laws to Northern Ireland in order to determine the proper classification of the
conflict, as well as to properly characterize the IRA and determine which
protections the group should have been afforded legally.
I. BACKGROUND: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE
CONFLICT
A. The Struggle for Independence
The long, bitter conflict that plagues Northern Ireland dates back to the
seventeenth century. For several hundred years, Ireland existed as a colony
of the British Crown. At that time, native Irish Catholic farmers and

8. Id.
9. Aside from Irish Republican outcry and a handful of infamous prison hunger strikes that took
place at the time, the matter has been essentially ignored by the international community.
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peasantry lived under the oppression of an English Protestant ruling class.10
Despite centuries of colonial occupation, the majority of Irishmen never
assimilated into British culture. While the Irish may have lived under the
common law of the crown, they maintained their own customs, traditions,
and sense of identity.11 Eventually, religion and nationality intertwined and
played an essential role in labeling parties to the conflict.12 As Irish Catholic
natives began to voice grievances and a desire for independence from
England, religious affiliation became an indicator of nationality and political
preference.13 Identification as “Protestant” became synonymous with
“British loyalist,” representing that portion of the population wishing to
remain under British rule.14 In contrast, “Catholic” became synonymous with
“Irish nationalist” or “republican,” representing those who desired freedom
for the entire island and sought to establish a completely independent Irish
republic.15 As political scientist Joanne McEvoy states, the conflict in
Northern Ireland no longer contains a religious element in any real sense, but
rather “is about two groups with allegiances to two different national
communities . . . [I]t is about national identity whereby the Nationalist
community looks to the Republic of Ireland as the ‘motherland’ whereas the
Unionist community looks to Britain as their patron state.”16
Inevitably, tensions between the Catholic and Protestant communities
mounted. By the mid-nineteenth century, several organizations dedicated to
the establishment of an independent Irish republic emerged. The most
notable and effective of these organizations was the Irish Republican
Brotherhood (“IRB”),17 which took action in the early twentieth century.

10. During this time, a complex social class divide separated the wealthy English Protestant
landowners from the poor Irish Catholic farmers and peasants. After several hundred years the farmers
and peasants, who were mostly Catholic, were forced to endure the oppression of the Protestant ruling
class. The British Crown considered the ‘Emerald Isle’ to be a colony that existed purely for its economic
benefit, making up “The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.”
11. Alpha M. Connelly, Political Violence and International Law: The Case of Northern Ireland,
16 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 79, 82 (1987–1988).
12. Initially, the tension stemmed from the British Protestants’ view of the Irish Catholics as papists
who were placing their allegiance to the Pope above their commitment to God.
13. JANE JOANNE MCEVOY, POLITICS OF NORTHERN IRELAND 34 (2008).
14. Id. at 9.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 8.
17. Robert Perry, Revising Irish History: The Northern Ireland Conflict and the War of Ideas, 40
J. EUR. STUD. 329, 344 (2010).
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1. 1916 Easter Rising and the Proclamation of the Irish Republic
The Easter Rising of 1916 represents the “beacon of militant Irish
nationalism,”18 a lofty attempt to win independence for Ireland once and for
all. On April 24, 1916, seven members of the IRB claiming to speak on
behalf of The Provisional Government of the Republic of Ireland drafted and
signed The Proclamation of the Irish Republic.19 These men posted the
Proclamation outside the main post office in the center of Dublin, addressing
the people of Ireland20:
Irishmen and Irishwomen: In the name of God and of the dead generations
from which she receives her old tradition of nationhood, Ireland, through
us, summons her children to her flag and strikes for her freedom. . .
. . . We declare the right of the people of Ireland to the ownership of
Ireland, and to the unfettered control of Irish destinies, to be sovereign and
indefeasible. The long usurpation of that right by a foreign people and
government has not extinguished the right, nor can it ever be extinguished
except by the destruction of the Irish people. In every generation the Irish
people have asserted their right to national freedom and sovereignty; six
times during the past three hundred years they have asserted it in arms.
Standing on that fundamental right and again asserting it in arms in the
face of the world, we hereby proclaim the Irish Republic as a Sovereign
Independent State. And we pledge our lives and the lives of our comradesin-arms to the cause of its freedom, of its welfare, and of its exaltation
among the nations…
. . . Until our arms have brought the opportune moment for the
establishment of the permanent National Government, representative of
the whole people of Ireland and elected by the suffrages of all her men and
women, the Provision Government, hereby constituted will administer the
civil and military affairs of the Republic in trust for the people. . .
. . . Signed on behalf of the Provisional Government,
Thomas J. Clarke, Sean Mac Diermada, Thomas MacDonagh,
P.H. Pearse, Eamonn Ceannt, James Connolly, Joseph
Plunkett21

The posting of the Proclamation resulted in six days of fighting between
the Irish insurrectionaries and British forces, ending with the execution of all
of the signatories to the Proclamation.22 Despite its failure to establish
independence, the Rising succeeded in bringing physical force
republicanism to the fore of Irish politics.23

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Connelly, supra note 11, at 81.
Proclamation of the Irish Republic, 24 Apr. 1916; see also Connelly, supra note 11, at 81.
Proclamation of the Irish Republic, 24 Apr. 1916.
Id.
Connelly, supra note 11, at 82.
Perry, supra note 17, at 331.
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In the years following the Easter Rising the movement toward
establishing Irish independence gained momentum. In the 1918 all-Ireland
Parliamentary elections, Sinn Fein—the political wing of the IRB—won 73
of 105 Irish seats in the British Parliament.24 The Sinn Fein Parliamentarians
disavowed the current state of political affairs and refused to take up their
seats in the British Parliament. Instead, they held their own parliamentary
sessions in Dublin.25 The first Dáil Eireann (translated as “Assembly of
Ireland”) described itself as the parliament of the Irish Republic
“‘proclaimed in Dublin on Easter Monday, 1916, by the Irish Republican
Army acting on behalf of the Irish people.’”26 Although the Dáil was not
recognized by Britain, it continued to meet clandestinely while hostilities
with Britain continued.27
2. War of Independence and Partition, 1919-1921.
By 1919 the IRB, responsible for the 1916 Rising, reassembled to
become the Irish Republican Army.28 The IRA brought back the physical
force republicanism employed in the 1916 Rising to fight the Irish War of
Independence from 1919 until 1921.29 Several important political events
took place during this time. First, in 1920, at the height of the war, the British
Parliament passed a bill partitioning all of Ireland.30 The Government of
Ireland Act shifted Ireland’s status from a colony of Britain to an official
province of the United Kingdom.31 Then, in 1921, the hostilities ended with
the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty.32 Finally, Ireland had won its long
awaited independence from Britain. In 1922 the Irish Free State—The
Republic of Ireland—was established.33

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

TIM PAT COOGAN, THE IRA 23 (3d ed. 1987).
Id.
Connelly, supra note 11, at 83.
Id.
COOGAN, supra note 24, at 23.
See JOHN F. MORRISON, THE ORIGINS AND RISE OF DISSIDENT IRISH REPUBLICANISM: THE
ROLE AND IMPACT OF ORGANIZATIONAL SPLITS 7 (2013).
30. Id.
31. Government of Ireland Act 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5 c. 67 § 2(1) (Gr. Brit.).
32. See Anglo-Irish Treaty, Dec. 6, 1921.
33. See generally Constitution of the Irish Free State 1922.
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For many Irishmen both inside and outside of the IRA, however, the
Irish Free State represented only limited success, as part of the island
remained partitioned. Only twenty-six of Ireland’s thirty-two counties were
granted independence from British occupation; the remaining six
northeastern-most counties—which, together, make up the province of
Ulster—remained under British rule.34 The British government created
Stormont, the Parliament building and estate in Belfast, Northern Ireland,
and operated from there.35 While the original issue revolved around gaining
independence for all of Ireland, now the bone of contention was now the
political status of “the six counties”—Northern Ireland.
B. The Northern Ireland Conflict Begins
The Parliament in Stormont was quite aware of the discontent among
the nationalist population regarding the division of Ireland. To maintain its
foothold in Belfast, Parliament passed the Special Powers Act.36 An
extraordinarily sweeping piece of legislation, the Special Powers Act
authorized the Minister of Home Affairs to take any and all measures
necessary for preserving peace and maintaining order in Northern Ireland.37
These measures and orders were to be implemented by the Royal Ulster
Constabulary (“RUC”), the British police force in Northern Ireland. Among
other things, the Act authorized the Minister to ban meetings and

34. Jay M. Spillane, Terrorists and Special Status: The British Experience in Northern Ireland, 9
HASTINGS INT’L COMP. L. REV. 481, 484–85 (1986).
35. Id. at 485.
36. Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) 1922, 12 & 14 Geo. V, c. 5.
37. Id. § 1(3).
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publications, to arrest without a warrant, to intern suspects without trial, to
search persons and vehicles anywhere, and to declare various
organizations—for instance, Sinn Fein—unlawful.38 Finally, a catch-all
provision in Section 2(4) of the Special Powers Act provided:
If any person does any act of such a nature as to be calculated to be
prejudicial to the preservation of the peace or maintenance of order in
Northern Ireland and not specifically provided for in the regulations he
shall be deemed guilty of an offence as against the regulations. 39

At the outset, Parliament intended the act to be temporary, albeit
renewable annually.40 Nevertheless, the mutually exclusive nature of the
British Protestant and Irish Catholic identities led to a belief over time that
Northern Ireland was a problem without a solution; that tensions arising out
of the political status of the six counties could only be managed rather than
resolved.41 In 1928 Parliament extended the Act’s application for an
additional five years, and in 1933 made the Act permanent.42
The impact of the Special Powers Act in conjunction with the effects of
World War II resulted in the muffling of republican dissident activity for
several decades. But by the 1960s, many Western nations had largely
recovered from the aftermath of World War II. Moreover, the Civil Rights
movement in America was in full swing, influencing oppressed minority
groups across the world. Among these inspired groups was the Irish Catholic
population in Northern Ireland.
“The deprivation and discrimination suffered over the years by
Catholics . . . fuelled a resentment which [] found expression in the civil
rights movement of the 1960s and a more militant voice in the long tradition
of armed resistance by the I.R.A. to British oppression.”43 A report by Lord
Cameron, then Governor of Northern Ireland, concluded that the various
factors contributing to this indignation included: a rising sense of injustice
among the Catholic population regarding housing practices; discrimination
in the Loyalist-controlled police force; complaints of gerrymandering to
deny Catholic influence in local government in proportion to their numbers;
and a resentment over the government’s failure to investigate complaints or

38.
39.
40.

Id. §§ 3, 18, 23, 25.
Id. § 2(4).
WHYTE, How much discrimination was there under the Unionist regime, 1921-1968?, in
CONTEMPORARY IRISH STUDIES 1, 25 (Tom Gallagher & James O’Connell eds., 1983).
41. PAUL NOLAN, THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE MONITORING REPORT 14 (2013).
42. See WHYTE, supra note 40, at 22.
43. Connelly, supra note 11, at 83.
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provide a remedy for them.44 In the late-1960s Irish Catholics in Northern
Ireland staged a series of protests. Thus began “The Troubles.”
C. The Troubles
1. The Parties to the Conflict
“The Troubles” refers to an approximately thirty-year campaign to end
discrimination against the Catholic nationalist minority by the Protestant
loyalist-dominated government and police force. Beginning with the Battle
of the Bogside in 1969 and ending with the Good Friday Agreement in 1998,
The Troubles represented the latest chapter in the long-running saga of
armed resistance to a British presence in Ireland.
There are two, clear-cut sides in the conflict, but each side is composed
of multiple parties. Over the years, several paramilitaries have fought in the
name of the Catholic nationalists, but the Provisional IRA has been most
famous and effectual by far. The “Provos” or “PIRA” split from the original
IRA in 1969 and reorganized as a violent military faction.45 Though
technically incorrect, the Provisional IRA is most commonly known as,
simply, “the IRA.”46 The underlying purposes for reorganization of the IRA
were twofold: first, to continue to reject Northern Ireland as part of the
United Kingdom, and second, to provide armed protection for Catholic
communities besieged by the Protestant-controlled government, police force,
and military organizations.47 Specifically, the parties on the Protestant
loyalist side include the RUC—the British police force in Northern Ireland;
the British Army; and several loyalist paramilitaries: most notably the Ulster
Defence Association (“UDA”) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (“UVF”).48
Seventy years after the Rising, the IRA “still claimed to be an army of
national liberation, fighting to remove the last vestiges of colonial
occupation by the British from the northeastern part of Ireland.”49 The IRA
sought to produce bad propaganda throughout Northern Irish society to
undermine the legitimacy of the RUC, to raise the cost of keeping British
troops in the six counties, and to assert the IRA as the true police force and
44. See DISTURBANCES IN NORTHERN IRELAND: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION APPOINTED BY THE
GOVERNOR OF NORTHERN IRELAND, 1969, No. 532 (Lord Cameron, Chairman), cited in Spillane, supra
note 34, at 485 n.27.
45. COOGAN, supra note 24, at 366–67.
46. Therefore, the use of “the IRA” throughout this article is a reference to the Provisional IRA,
the violent military faction, and not the original IRA.
47. Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), THE MACKENZIE INST. (Jan. 1, 2016), http://macke
nzieinstitute.com/provisional-irish-republican-army-pira/ [https://perma.cc/PQ53-ZTWD].
48. Id. at 448.
49. Connelly, supra note 11, at 83.
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protector of Catholic communities in Northern Ireland.50 Before long, IRA
activities expanded to include attacks on British troops and the RUC. At last,
the paramilitary organizations on both sides engaged in full fledged guerilla
warfare.
2. The Troubles Begins
On August 12, 1969, the frustration and resentment of the Irish Catholic
community culminated in the Battle of the Bogside in County Derry.51 There,
loyalists held a customary parade in which they marched provocatively
through Catholic communities that Protestants had occupied historically.52
Massive rioting broke out, and RUC policemen from all over Northern
Ireland arrived to contain the crowd.53 Unable to control the political unrest,
the British government sent British troops into Northern Ireland to maintain
order.54 The IRA launched their military campaign to end British rule in
Ireland, and The Troubles had officially begun.
The overwhelming levels of sectarianism and violence brought about
by The Troubles led to massive changes in security policy in Northern
Ireland.55 A series of sweeping legislation gave security forces enormous
power to arrest and detain. The new laws permitted the authorities to strike
at suspected terrorists against whom sufficient evidence could not be
marshalled for an ordinary trial.56 In 1971, Stormont restructured the Special
Powers Act of 1922 and enforced an internment policy legalizing arrest,
detention, and imprisonment of suspected terrorists without trial.57
Concurrently, English judge Lord Diplock issued the “Diplock Report,”58
allowing a single judge to convict any suspected terrorist on the sole basis of

50. Id.
51. R. Poole & J. Llewellyn, The Battle of the Bogside, ALPHA HISTORY, http://alphahistory.com/
northernireland/battle-of-the-bogside/ [https://perma.cc/RLD3-Y3D4].
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Spillane, supra note 34, at 486.
55. For instance, Protestants in the Ardoyne area of Belfast–which is predominantly Catholic–fled,
only after setting fire to their own homes. The violence even trickled down into Ireland, as the British
Embassy in Dublin was burnt down. See 1971: NI Activates Internment Law, BBC NEWS (Aug. 9, 1971),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/august/9/newsid_4071000/4071849.stm [https://perma.
cc/2ZK2-NWS9].
56. Spillane, supra note 35, at 506 n.177.
57. Id.
58. Lord Diplock, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO CONSIDER LEGAL PROCEDURES TO DEAL WITH
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND (Cmnd. Ser. 5, No. 5185, 1972), http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/
hmso/diplock.htm#1 [https://perma.cc/YMG3-KEQA].
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his confession procured by the RUC.59 Then, in 1972, the British government
abolished the Parliament at Stormont, and instead implemented Direct Rule
from the Parliament in Westminster.60
3. Special Category Status
The Emergency Provisions Act of 1973 complemented Direct Rule,
emphasizing the use of the British military to apply security policy.61 The
Emergency legislation created policies which recognized the political nature
of terrorist offenses in two ways: first, these enhanced security powers were
available only to combat “terrorist” offenders, distinguished from ordinary
criminals on the basis of the political nature of their crimes.62 “The word
‘terrorism’ throughout [the] legislation refers to ‘the use of violence for
political ends and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the
public or any section of the public in fear.’”63 Second, those detained and
convicted under the Emergency powers were granted “Special Category
Status.”64 Under this regime, any prisoner convicted of a terrorist offense and
sentenced to more than nine months imprisonment was afforded Special
Category status.65, 66 IRA members imprisoned under the new security
policies of the early 1970s were granted Special Category Status across the
board.67 Thus, the explicit recognition of the political nature of Republican
59. Neil J. Conway & Gary Abrams, McFeely v. The United Kingdom: Death Knell for Prisoners
of The Maze, 3 ANTIOCH L. J. 99, 103 n.22 (1985) (“After arrest, many interned individuals are tortured
into making incriminating statements. The single judge ‘Diplock’ courts have been able to maintain an
85-90 percent conviction rate over the defendants based on evidence obtained solely from such
statements.”). Moreover, the legislation permitted the RUC to interrogate a suspect without legal counsel
for up to seven days. Id. Consequently, many interned suspects were tortured into giving coerced
confessions. Id. The single judge “Diplock” courts resulted in a 85–90% conviction rate, imprisoning
over 2,000 suspects by 1976. Id. at 103.
60. The British implemented Direct Rule following the “Bloody Sunday” massacre on March 24,
1972. There, British soldiers shot and killed thirteen innocent Catholics participating in a civil rights
march in Derry. A Chronology of the IRA Campaign in the 20th Century, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/shows/ira/etc/cron.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/2DYS-2Q4T]
[hereinafter CHRONOLOGY].
61. See generally Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973, c. 53 (UK) [hereinafter 1973
Act].
62. Id.
63. Spillane, supra note 34, at 489, citing 1973 Act, supra note 61, § 28(1) (emphasis added by
Spillane).
64. Lord Gardiner, Chairman, REPORT OF A COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER, IN THE CONTEXT OF CIVIL
LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS, MEASURES TO DEAL WITH TERRORISTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND 33–34
(No. 5847, 1975) [hereinafter Gardiner Report].
65. Id.
66. To be granted Special Category Status, these prisoners also must have been accepted by a
“compound leader.” Id.
67. Spillane, supra note 34, at 488.
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dissident activities meant IRA convicts were legally distinct from ordinary
criminals.
In contrast to the treatment of ordinary criminals, Special Category
prisoners were given a great deal of autonomy. Housed in hutted compounds
according to the paramilitary to which they claimed allegiance, Special
Category prisoners were permitted to organize themselves as POWs.68 Prison
guards rarely interacted with Special Category prisoners, who were instead
represented by a “compound leader.”69 Compound leaders acted as
commanding officers who organized the detainees’ daily routines, as well as
military orders and training.70 Special Category prisoners were also
exempted from regular prison work, permitted to wear their own clothes
rather than prison uniforms, allowed to spend their own money in the
canteen, and could receive more frequent visitors than ordinary criminals.71
The British government grew concerned about the political message
sent by recognition of IRA members as Special Category prisoners. Many
officials contended that the political nature of their terrorist offenses should
not be distinguished from the offenses of ordinary criminals. A 1978 report
by Lord Baker, summarizes and reflects on these concerns:
The Baker Report roundly criticized the retention of a definition of
terrorism as a political offense. It acknowledged the inconsistency in
downplaying the political motivation of terrorist violence through
Britain’s criminalization policy and maintaining a definition of terrorism
as “the use of violence for political ends.” Baker stated that the emphasis
should be “on the crime and not the motive of the criminal” in order to
divorce the act of terrorism from its political ends. Accordingly, Baker
recommended that the 1978 Act be amended to abandon the “political
ends” language in the definition of terrorism and that another definition be
adopted which emphasizes terrorists’ use of fear and coercion.” 72
Accordingly, in a 1975 report by Lord Gardiner concluded that “the
introducing of Special Category Status for convicted prisoners was a
serious mistake.73

In 1976, the British Government revoked Special Category Status, and
all prisoners convicted of terrorist acts were treated as ordinary criminals and

68.

Spillane, supra note 34, at 488, citing K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, TEN YEARS ON
89 (1980).
69. Spillane, supra note 34.
70. During this time, suspected members of the IRA were detained in two main prisons: Long Kesh
and Magilligan. Later, Long Kesh would be transformed into H.M. Maze Prison. The buildings at Maze
prison facility were H-Shaped, know as “H-blocks.” They would later become the setting for the infamous
prison hunger strikes in the early 1980s.
71. Spillane, supra note 34, at 488.
72. Id. at 489 n.51.
73. Gardiner Report, supra note 64.
IN NORTHERN IRELAND: THE LEGAL CONTROL OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE
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locked in H-Block prisons. On September 15, 1976, Kieran Nugent became
the first IRA member to be convicted of terrorism and not granted Special
Category status.74 In protest, Nugent refused to wear a prison uniform and
instead wrapped himself in a blanket, so as to differentiate himself from
ordinary criminals in the prison.75 Many other men and women joined him,
asserting that they were “political prisoners” and legally entitled to treatment
as POWs under the Third Geneva Convention.76 By the early 1980s, this
practice led to numerous hunger strikes, which succeeded in bringing global
attention to the conflict.77
In 1980, seven prisoners78 brought their case to the European
Commission on Human Rights, filing McFeeley v. United Kingdom. Among
many other complaints about their treatment at H.M. Maze prison, the IRA
prisoners argued that they were legally entitled to Special Category Status
under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights.79 Under
Article 9:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his
religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 80

Accordingly, the prisoners argued that wearing ordinary prison
uniforms and engaging in ordinary prison work was contrary to their
beliefs.81 They asserted that since they considered themselves to be “political

74. CHRONOLOGY, supra note 60.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. “The seven prisoners-applicants were: Leo Green, interned 13 months before trial and denied
access to legal counsel-convicted of the murder of a police inspector based on an admission made while
being interrogated; Brendon Hughes, sentenced to 14 years imprisonment for possession of firearms and
explosives-he and Green refused to recognize the Court’s jurisdiction as a matter of republican principle;
Raymond McCartney, convicted of murder, his 57 day trial contested the confession he signed during
interrogation at the Castlereagh Detention Center; Thomas McFeeley, sentenced to 26 years
imprisonment for robbery and possession of firearms-his body showed burns obtained during
interrogation; Thomas McKearney, confessed to IRA membership after three days of torture—civil rights
activist since early youth-medical evidence showed severe marks of torture applied to induce confession;
Sean McKenna, arrested in the Republic of Ireland and brought into Northern Ireland covertly by British
soldiers-found guilty of IRA membership and attempted murder.” Neil J. Conway & Gary Abrams,
McFeely v. The United Kingdom: Death Knell for Prisoners of The Maze, 3 ANTIOCH L. J. 99, 103 n.22
(1985) [hereinafter McFeeley].
79. McFeeley, supra note 78, at 106.
80. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened
for signature, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, reprinted in 1950 Y.B. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 418
[hereinafter European Convention].
81. McFeeley et. al v. the United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H. R. 8317/78 (1980), ¶ 27.
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prisoners” or “prisoners or war,” they “should not be subjected to the same
prison regime as other prisoners convicted of ‘ordinary’ criminal offences.”82
On the other hand, the British government contended that the term
“belief” within Article 9 did not extend to mere opinions about political
matters.83 Rather, they argued, “belief” related only to spiritual or
philosophical convictions “which have an identifiable formal content.”84
Ultimately, the Commission sided with the British government,
dismissing the prisoners’ Article 9 complaint.85 The Commission treated the
case as a simple matter of statutory interpretation.86 The Commission
provided no further explanation, nor did it cite the authority it relied upon in
coming to its decision. Setting aside the question of whether or not the
Commission’s interpretation of the European Convention of Human Rights
was accurate, this paper turns to other considerations and addresses
arguments available to the IRA prisoners in asserting their right to special
treatment under international law.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Classifying Armed Conflicts
Determining whether IRA prisoners were legally entitled to POW status
cannot be done without first classifying the conflict between Britain and the
IRA, as it existed during The Troubles. The fundamental question is whether
The Troubles is more appropriately classified as an international armed
conflict (“IAC”), or as a non-international armed conflict (“NIAC”).87
Although international humanitarian law governs the treatment of noncombatants in both international and non-international armed conflicts,88
there are important legal differences. The key distinction between IACs and

82. Id.
83. Id. ¶ 29.
84. Id.
85. “The Commission is of the opinion that the right to such a preferential status for a certain
category of prisoner is not amongst the rights guaranteed by the Convention or by Article 9 in particular.
Moreover, it considers that the freedom to manifest religion or belief ‘in practice’ as contained in this
provision cannot be interpreted to include a right for the applicants to wear their own clothes in prison.”
Id. ¶ 30.
86. Id. ¶ 30–33.
87. The acronyms IAC, NIAC, and NLM are my own, created for the purposes of this paper. These
acronyms are not used generally across political science or international law literature.
88. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal
on Jurisdiction, ¶ 66–70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). It is also important
to note here that international humanitarian law continues to apply from the initiation of the armed conflict
until a peaceful settlement is reached. Id. ¶ 70.70))
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NIACs under international humanitarian law—at least for the purposes of
this paper—is that non-combatants may be entitled to POW status only in
IACs.89
In general, an “armed conflict” exists wherever (1) organized armed
groups are (2) engaged in fighting of some intensity.90 Because “intensity”
has varying degrees, armed conflicts may exist on a sliding scale from civil
unrest to full blown war. Armed conflicts may be classified further as either
an IAC or a NIAC. An IAC exists any time two nation-States are at odds
with one another, and at least one of the States resorts to armed force.91 On
the other hand, a non-international armed conflict is created where a State
and some other non-State group, organization, or governmental authority,
are in disagreement, and armed force is used.92
The IAC/NIAC dichotomy is muddied wherever the dispute involves
an established State on one side, and an organized armed group that
proclaims to be fighting on behalf of another State on the other side. These
conflicts may be considered either a national liberation movement or a civil
war. While national liberation movements are viewed as international
disputes and fall under the IAC umbrella, civil wars are deemed purely
internal matters and are categorized as NIACs.93 The subtle yet important
distinction between an national liberation movement and a civil war is that
in the former, the struggle involves a legitimate use of force against unlawful
occupation.94 In addition, the organized armed group fighting on behalf of
the ostensible state must meet certain criteria.95, 96
B. The Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols
Whether classified as an IAC or NIAC, national liberation movement
or civil war, all armed conflicts are governed by The Geneva Conventions
and their Additional Protocols (“The Conventions”). The Conventions are a
series of international agreements created in response to the savagery

89.
90.

See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 3.
Mary Ellen O’Connell, Initial Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict in International Law,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 13 (2d ed. 2009).
91. Id.
92. While conflicts not of an international character may be “internal” conflicts, e.g. civil wars, it
is becoming more commonplace for the organized armed group opposing a State to be external to the
territory of that State, e.g. Al-Qaeda versus the United States. Thus, it is more appropriate to refer to these
types of conflict in the abstract as non-international conflicts rather than internal conflicts.
93. O’CONNELL l, supra note 90, at 13.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See infra Section II.B.1.
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exhibited during World War II.97 Moreover, the Additional Protocols to the
four Geneva Conventions were adopted in 1977 in response to the increasing
number of non-international armed conflicts and wars of national
liberation.98 Together, The Conventions contain the most important rules
limiting the barbarity of war, and establish standards and protections for the
treatment of non-combatants in armed conflicts.99 The term “noncombatants” encompasses those individuals who do not participate in the
fighting (civilians, medics, and aid workers) as well as those who once did,
but no longer do, take part in the fighting (the wounded, sick and
shipwrecked troops, and prisoners of war).100
The components of The Conventions are context specific; that is, the
classification of an armed conflict determines which provisions of The
Conventions apply. First, in IACs, all four Geneva Conventions apply.101
Most importantly, the Third Geneva Convention, which governs the
treatment of non-combatants, applies to all IACs.102 In national liberation
movements—a particular type of IAC—Protocol I also applies.103 On the
other hand, in NIACs, only Article 3 of The Conventions applies.104
Similarly, if the NIAC is classified as a civil war, then Protocol II also
applies.105

97.

The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE

OF THE RED CROSS (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/genev

a-conventions/overview-geneva-conventions.htm [https://perma.cc/U3BA-4G54]. The first Geneva
Convention was created in 1949; the second, third, and fourth Geneva Conventions, along with Additional
Protocols I, II, and III, were agreed upon sequentially in the following decades.
98. Id.
99. See generally, Geneva Conventions, supra note 2.
100. Geneva Convention (I) for the Amerlioration of the Condition of the Wounded and the Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, art. 13, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
101. “[A]ll cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or
more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.” Id. at
art. 2.
102. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 3; Geneva Conventions, supra note 2, Protocol I.
103. Geneva Conventions, supra note 2, Protocol I.
104. Id. art. 3.
105. Id. Protocol II.
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1. The Law in International Armed Conflicts
The Third Geneva Convention governs the treatment on noncombatants in all IACs. Protocol I supplements the Third Convention by
extending those humanitarian guarantees to national liberation
movements.106 The text of the Third Convention and Protocol I establishes
when an IAC exists, and who qualifies as a member of an armed group in an
IAC. Pursuant to The Conventions, only those individuals deemed a member
of an armed group in an IAC are entitled POW status.107
The Third Geneva Convention discusses the general protection of
POWs and their captivity, including special conditions of internment,
quarters, food, clothing, discipline, and organization, while imprisoned.
Article 2 sets out the conditions necessary for an IAC to exist. while Article
4 defines the category of persons within that conflict who qualify as noncombatants, and eligible for legal protection.108
Pursuant to Article 2, an IAC exists (1) in all cases of declared war
between two parties to the Convention, even if the state of war is not
recognized by one of those parties;109 and (2) in all cases of partial or total
occupation of the territory of a contracting party.110 Under Article 4,
individuals imprisoned by the enemy qualify for Third Convention
106. Id. Protocol I.
107. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 3; Geneva Conventions, supra note 2, Protocol I.
108. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 3, at Additional Protocol I, art. 43 (2).
109. “[T]he present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not
recognized by one of them.” Id. art. 2.
110. Id. (“The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory
of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.”).
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protection so long as they are either: (1) members of the armed forces of a
Party to the conflict111 or (2) a member of another organized armed group
involved in the conflict, and meet four additional criteria.112 Finally, under
Article 5, should any doubt arise as to whether the non-combatant belongs
to one of the groups as defined in Article 4, the individual must be granted
POW status in the interim, until a “competent tribunal” makes a final
determination:
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a
belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to
any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the
protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has
been determined by a competent tribunal. 113

Similarly, Protocol I defines a national liberation movement as an
armed conflict “in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination
and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right
of self-determination.”114 Under Protocol I, “armed forces” are all armed
groups under a command responsible for the conduct of its subordinates, and
a member of such a force is a “combatant.”115 Furthermore, combatants who
distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they are engaged
in military operations by carrying their arms openly are “prisoners of war”
upon capture by the adverse party.116
In sum, so long as a conflict may be defined as an IAC or a national
liberation movement, and a prisoner may be characterized as a member of
the armed forces or an organized armed group, the non-combatant in
question must be granted POW status.
2. The Law in Non-International Armed Conflicts
While the provisions within the four Geneva Conventions pertain only
to IACs, the drafters contemplated NIACs in Common Article 3.117 Common
Article 3 is so named because it appears consistently throughout all four of
the Conventions. Article 3 contains fundamental rules regarding noncombatants, and is is especially powerful because no derogation is permitted

111. Id. art. 4.
112. Id. For members of organized armed groups to be granted POW status, they must (a) be
commanded by a person responsible for subordinates, (b) wear a fixed distinctive sign (such as a uniform
or armband) recognizable at a distance, (c) carry arms openly, and (d) conduct their operations in
accordance with the laws of war.
113. Id. art. 5.
114. Geneva Conventions, supra note 2, Protocol I, art. 1, sec. 4.
115. Id.
116. Spillane, supra note 34, at 497.
117. Geneva Conventions, supra note 2, art. 3.

CAESAR (STUDENT NOTE) - FOR PUBLICATION (DO NOT DELETE)

342

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

3/3/2017 2:02 PM

[Vol 27:323

from any of its provisions.118 Subsection (1) of the Article lists several
prohibitions relating to the treatment of those no longer taking part in the
hostilities, namely:
(a)Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; . . .
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording
all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples.119

As history progressed, NIACs became more the norm than the
exception. The international community thus supplemented Common Article
3 with Protocol II.120 Protocol II strengthens the protections afforded to noncombatants in NIACs and extends those protections to internal (i.e. “civil”)
wars.121 Specifically, Protocol II applies to:
[A]rmed conflicts . . . which take place in the territory of a High
Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or
other organized armed groups which, under responsible command,
exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry
out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this
Protocol.122

III. APPLICATION
A. An International or a Non-International Armed Conflict?
That the Northern Ireland conflict as it existed during The Troubles rose
to the level of armed conflict is undisputed. The existence of armed groups
is self-evident, and the intensity of the conflict is marked by the need to send
in armed forces, rather than mere policemen, to quell unrest.123 Whether the
conflict may be classified as an international rather than a non-international
conflict, however, has been virtually ignored. Most of the literature on The
Troubles has assumed that the conflict was of a non-international character.
Presumably, the logic is as follows: the IRA was an insurgent group fighting

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Geneva Conventions, supra note 2, art. 3, sec. 1.
Id. Protocol II.
Id.
Id.
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, HOW IS THE TERM “ARMED CONFLICT”
DEFINED IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW? 3 (2008), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other
/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2QU-GUXU].
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on behalf of Northern Ireland, a province of the UK. Thus, the conflict was
not between two High Contracting Parties (The UK and Ireland), but rather
between one High Contracting Party (the UK) and dissidents within its own
territory (the IRA). Furthermore, the notion that The Troubles qualifies as
national liberation movement has been overlooked—perhaps because the
UK did not ratify Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions until 1998.
A closer look at The Troubles and the perspective of the nationalists,
however, reveals that there is a strong case to be made in classifying the
conflict as international, rather than non-international. To reiterate, the
classification of the conflict as either and international armed conflict or a
non-international armed conflict is essential for the purposes of determining
whether the prisoners at H.M. Maze Prison should have been awarded POW
status, or at least continued to be awarded Special Category Status.124
While the British government has maintained that the conflict was
purely within the domain of the UK, the Republic of Ireland never issued an
official statement about the status of the conflict at that time.125 There is
evidence, however, that the Irish government did not believe British control
and occupation was legitimate.126 Moreover, the Irish government felt that
international intervention in the conflict was needed.127 At the outbreak of
The Troubles, the Irish Minister for External Affairs made a requested a
meeting with the United Nations Security Council, where he urged the U.N.
to send troops to help control the situation in Derry.128 An official U.N.
synopsis of that meeting—U.N. Security Council meeting 1503 on August
20, 1969—offers insight into the Republic’s position:
[The Minister for External Affairs] [took] exception to the argument that
the situation in Northern Ireland fell exclusively within the domestic
jurisdiction of the United Kingdom [and] stated that the present situation
in the Six Counties of Northern Ireland had its origins in the partition of
Ireland, a unilateral act on the part of the United Kingdom Government
which had never been conceded to by the Government of Ireland whose
declared policy was to bring about reunification by peaceful means. The
persistent denial by the United Kingdom Government of their civil rights
to a large part of the population of Northern Ireland had culminated in the
present crisis.129

124. Steven Haines, Northern Ireland 1968-1998, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 141 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst ed., 2012).
125. Id. at 117–45.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. “Proposals by his Government that the United Kingdom ask for the dis-patch of a United
Nations peace-keeping force and, subsequently, that a joint British-Irish peace-keeping force be
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Moreover, both sides conceded that the immediate situation in Derry
brought about by the Bloody Sunday massacre required armed forces to be
maintained. The Irish Minister urged the participation of an impartial
authority out of a concern that the grave situation in Northern Ireland could
become aggravated to a degree likely to affect relations between Great
Britain and Ireland:
The calling of British troops had been a confession of the inability of the
Government of the six counties to maintain law and order impartially
through its police force. There was need, he stressed, for an impartial
peace-keeping force, inasmuch as the use of British troops constituted a
basic factor in the perpetuation of partition. The Council must consider
also that the tension created by these events might spread beyond the area
itself and lead to friction between two neighbouring Member States. 130

As it happens, the Council meeting was adjourned and the matter went
no further; the British government had been successful behind the scenes.
Evidently, while the representatives of the Republic of Ireland did not issue
a formal statement on the matter, they clearly opposed the actions of the
British behind closed doors.
1. A National Liberation Movement?
The suggestion of the Irish Minister in the U.N. Security Council
meeting may have been that the IRA was engaged in a struggle for national
liberation. To be sure, since the early-twentieth century, the IRA contended
that it was fighting for the liberation of the whole island of Ireland.131 The
IRA never recognized the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1922 granting the twentysix counties freedom from British occupation; they believed that only when
the remaining six counties were free and united with the rest of the island
would Ireland be complete.132 Moreover, the IRA never recognized any
government in Northern Ireland as legitimate. The IRA viewed Sinn Fein as
the true political party of Ireland, with the freedom and unification with the
six counties as the utmost priority on its agenda.133 Thus the IRA holds that
it was, and had always been, engaged in a national liberation movement—
established had been rejected by the British Government. The Government of Ireland therefore felt
obliged to appeal to the Security Council for the dis-patch of a United Nations peace-keeping force, since
it could not stand by and see the people in the six counties of Northern Ireland suffer injury; nor could it
tolerate the tensions created along the border between the two areas which might give rise to serious
disturbances in its own State.” UNITED NATIONS, MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND
SECURITY: SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND 139, http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/69-71/Chapter%
208/69-71_08-7-Situation%20in%20Northern%20Ireland.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RZY-GWHF].
130. Id. at 140.
131. Haines, supra note 124.
132. Id.
133. See Connelly, supra note 11, at 80n.3.
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and therefore an international armed conflict—with the British government
over the political status of Northern Ireland.134
The IRA appears to have met all the criteria for self-determination, that
is, a historical connection and claim to the territory which is occupied by a
foreign power, and for asserting the protection of a minority ethnic group.135
The IRA of The Troubles was an organized armed group certainly with
historical claims to the six counties, acting to protect Irish Catholics in
Northern Ireland.
Furthermore, the question between the characterization of an armed
conflict and that of the parties involved is always and inevitably intertwined.
A group of landmark U.S. Supreme Court cases spoke to the characterization
of armed conflicts when they turn on the characterization of the armed
groups involved.136 In the Prize Cases, the Supreme Court noted that when
rebels “occupy and hold in a hostile manner a certain portion of territory;
have declared their independence; have cast off their allegiance; have
organized armies; [and] have commenced hostilities against their formed
sovereign, the world acknowledges them as belligerents, and the contest a
war.”137 Thus, it is at least arguable that where an organized armed group can
satisfy the Prize Cases criteria, it is an army of national liberation engaged
in an international armed conflict, and must be afforded rights and guarantees
under Protocol I to the Geneva Convention protection. The only criteria of
the Prize Cases the IRA may perhaps not fulfill is the occupation and control
of a portion of territory. Because the British government asserted lawful
control over Northern Ireland at that time, the answer to this question turns
on whether the IRA has a legitimate claim in its assertion to be fighting on
behalf of the Republic of Ireland itself. This issue is grounded in Article 2 of
the third Geneva Convention, discussed below.

134. Regardless, an organized group’s subjective perception of its own status does not necessarily
make it so; just because the IRA viewed itself as a national liberation movement for Ireland does not
automatically make the claim true according to international law. Today, the ostensible arguments again
the IRA as a national liberation movement are that IRA of 1922 War of Independence was a different
organization than it is presently. Therefore, it was not a single, cohesive group throughout the decades,
but a group that has morphed and transformed. In addition, the group no longer enjoys popular support,
and representative of the opinion of the population that it purports to represent. While this contention
certainly holds water in the post-Good Friday Agreement world, it is weak on the merits if analyzed in
the context of The Troubles.
135. U.N. Charter arts. 1, 73.
136. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1862).
137. Id. at 666–67.
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2. The Third Geneva Convention
The IRA would likely be able to make a claim that the conflict qualifies
under Article 2 of the third Geneva Convention, albeit with many caveats.
While the UK government always held the events in Northern Ireland were
a completely internal matter, nationalists—in Ireland and America alike—
consistently asserted that the conflict was a war to expel British authority
from the island of Ireland.138 In other words, the IRA has always maintained
that “Northern Ireland” is not a separate province; rather, it is the “North of
Ireland.”139 To this day, they are awaiting the rightful return of the six
counties to Ireland, and the unification of the entire island as one nation.140
Thus to nationalists, The Troubles was, under Article 2, a case of declared
war arising between two High Contracting Parties (the UK and Ireland) even
though the state of war—at least as characterized by nationalists—was not
recognized by the British government. At the very least, it would qualify
under the second part of Article 2, which goes on to state that it applies in
“all cases of partial or total occupation on the territory of a High Contracting
Party,” that is, on Irish territory.141
Moving on from Article 2, one must then determine if IRA prisoners
fall under the category of persons to which Article 4 of the third Convention
applies. Accepting, for the moment, the assertion that Ireland itself was a
party to the conflict, members of the IRA would qualify as members of the
armed forces of a party to the conflict, or at least volunteer corps forming
part of such armed forces; at least that was the IRA’s contention. However,
the fact of the matter is that the Anglo Irish Treaty of 1922 created one
separate legal entity: the Republic of Ireland, which did not include Northern
Ireland. Moreover, the Republic did not fund the IRA, and did not send its
own troops into Northern Ireland to support them. Thus, the argument that
Ireland was a party to the conflict does not hold water. The more prudent
case for the IRA would be to assert that they qualified under subsection 2 of
Article 4 as an organized resistance movement. This also fails, however, as
the IRA did not fulfill the four required conditions. The guerrilla warfare and
terrorist tactics employed by the IRA violated conditions (c) and (d)—
carrying their arms open and conducting their operations in accordance with
the laws and customs of war—disqualifying them as persons entitled to POW
status under Article 4.

138.
139.
140.
141.

COOGAN, supra note 24, at 40–41.
‘Real’ Irish Republican Army (rIRA) Statement, 28 January 2003, Cain Web Service.
COOGAN, supra note 24, at xx.
Third Geneva Convention, supra note 3, art. 2.
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Finally, the IRA could insist that because the status of the IRA prisoners
was in dispute, they were entitled to a decision under an Article 5 tribunal to
determine whether they were eligible for POW status under the third Geneva
Convention. While McFeely ostensibly serves as that Article 5 tribunal, the
scope of its decision is unclear. Because the Commission’s analysis was
limited to rights asserted under Article 9 of the European Convention on
Human Rights and because the Commission provided no explanation
indicating the authority in which its decision was grounded, it is certainly
tenable that the IRA prisoners are entitled to an additional, official decision
on the matter. This, however, they have never received. Nevertheless, even
if a tribunal were arranged to determine the status of the IRA prisoners at the
time, it is highly unlikely that it would be resolved in their favor, namely
because it is very difficult to separate the legal analysis of history without
the hindsight bias. First, because of the way politics has played out, today it
is by and large settled that Northern Ireland is part of the UK, not part of
Ireland. Second, since 2001, terrorism has been condemned as abhorrent on
a global scale, and the recognition of terrorism as a legitimate political act
has been downright repudiated by the international community. Therefore,
the IRA’s argument as belonging to armed groups under subsection 1 of
Article 4 would be rejected, and instead analyzed under subsection 2. As
previously mentioned, the IRA does not meet the criteria of subsection 2
under any circumstances. Thus, even if the conflict could be classified as an
international one, it is unlikely that the IRA prisoners would be entitled to
POW status now, nor at the height of The Troubles.
3. The Law Pertaining to Non-International Armed Conflicts: A
Reprieve
If one does not buy the argument that The Troubles manifested an
international armed conflict, then by default, it is a non-international armed
conflict, to which Common Article 3 and Protocol II of the Geneva
Conventions thus apply. Here, the British government assuredly ran afoul of
international law with respect to the treatment of IRA prisoners. First, the
Emergency legislation of the early 1970s and 1980s violated the judicial
guarantees set out in subsection (1)(d).142 To reiterate, that subsection
prohibits the sentencing over non-combatants without judgment pronounced
by a regularly constituted court affording certain judicial guarantees.143
Because Diplock courts were by and large a significant exception to
regularly-constituted trials by jury, these proceedings were a non-
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See supra Section I.C.3, Special Category Status.
Geneva Conventions, supra note 2, Common Article 3, § 1(d).
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permissible derogation from Common Article 3.144 Furthermore, Protocol II
prohibits coerced confessions under Article 6, subsection f.145 While that
remains an argument for another day, infamous prosecutions such as the
Guildford Four and the Maguire Seven are a testament to the many illegal
and false confessions coerced by the British authorities during The
Troubles146 While the UK did not ratify Protocol II until 1998, an application
of international law as it stands today to the situation at that time would hold
the British government in violation of it.
CONCLUSION
This paper contends that the conflict in Northern Ireland has been too
often and too easily dismissed as a purely internal matter, and its potential
status as an international armed conflict has been improperly disregarded. A
closer look at the perspective of the Republic of Ireland at the height of The
Troubles, albeit unofficial and behind closed doors, reveals a much stronger
case for classifying the conflict as an international armed conflict than it has
been given. The strongest argument for categorizing The Troubles as an
international armed conflict probably under Protocol I. The UK, however,
did not ratify Protocol I until 1998, after the signing of the Good Friday
Agreement which is recognized as the official end of the conflict, bringing
peace to Northern Ireland. Therefore, under international law as it exists and
applies to Britain today, the IRA prisoners of the 1970s and 1980s would be
entitled to POW status. Even if the conflict was classified as noninternational, the IRA prisoners still should have been afforded some
distinguished sort of status, because the British government derogated from
Common Article 3 when it instated internment and Diplock prosecutions.
For that reason, the British government should have retained Special
Category Status for the IRA under international law as it did in fact apply at
the height of The Troubles. Perhaps if they had done so, the political strife
between the IRA and British forces would not be primed to persist for
decades to come.

144. Id. at Protocol II, art. 6.
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https://www.theguardian.com/uk/1999/oct/19/davidpallister1 [https://perma.cc/7VB4-WW7L].

